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•
Defending the Mentally III In
Maryland: The Guilty Plea vs.
The Insanity Defense
by Paul Handy

T

he decision to enter a plea in a
criminal proceeding is fraught
with constitutional, ethical and
strategical dilemmas. Consider the fol~
lowing situation: counsel has been re~
tained by a client accused of committing
a serious crime. Preliminary discovery
and investigation indicate that the State
has a strong case for conviction. How~
ever, one or more psychiatrists who
have evaluated the client conclude that
he was mentally impaired at the time of
the alleged criminal act. The defendant
is found competent to stand trial. How
should he be advised to plead?
Before advising the client on the plea,
defense counsel should consider some
recent developments in Maryland law.
There is no longer an appeal as of right
from a guilty plea. I The defendant now
carries the burden of persuading by a
preponderance of the evidence on the
insanity issue. 2 A successful insanity de~
fense carries the collateral consequence
of a criminal conviction as well as an ad~
judication of "not criminally respon~
sible."3 An individual found both guilty
and insane may be confined for a period
longer than the maximum sentence for
the offense committed. 4
Even if the defendant has a meritor~
ious insanity defense, there are numer~
ous reasons to forego its use. These rea~
sons include: (1) a jury is unlikely to re~
turn an insanity verdict where the act
was egregious; (2) the defendant might
prefer a definite prison term to indefinite
confinement in a mental institution; (3)
the defendant might wish to avoid the
double consequences of the "guilty"
and "insane" verdicts; and (4) if it is a
political crime, an insanity defense
would diminish its impact. s
Nevertheless, the insanity defense
does have certain advantages for the de~
fendant. A guilty verdict alone is insuf~
ficient to determine sentencing where
the defendant requires psychiatric as~
sistance. Also, in a capital case, the in~
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sanity defense excuses the defendant
from criminal responsibility, thus re~
moving the peril of the death penalty.
This article will explore some of the
factors to be considered in choosing
either to plead guilty or to raise an in~
sanity defense. The issues of civil com~
mitment,6 competency to stand tria1,7
and plea bargaining will not be discussed
except where relevant. Defense counsel
should attempt to convince the State's
Attorney to enter a stet or nolle prose~
qui and refer the defendant for civil
commitment. This article will focus on
the procedural requirements, ethical
considerations, and consequences of the
guilty plea and of the insanity defense.

The Guilty Plea
In Maryland, the defendant may plead
not guilty, guilty, or, with the court's
permission, nolo contendere. 8 In addi~
tion, under the new statute, the defen~
dant may interpose the defense of in~
sanity,9 which is titled "not criminally
responsible." 10
The plea of guilty involves the waiver
of the defendant's constitutional rights
to a trial by jury, confrontation of wit~
nesses, and the privilege against self~in~
crimination. ll Unlike the plea of nolo
contendere,12 the guilty plea is an admis~
sion of actual guilt,13 and the admission
of guilt has significance for collateral
proceedings. For example, under the
doctrine of collateral estoppel, the guilty
plea operates as a rebuttable presump~
tion as to common factual issues. 14
The United States Supreme Court has
upheld the validity of an "Alford plea"
in which the defendant pleads guilty but
asserts his actual innocence. IS In North
Carolina v. Alford,16 the defendant pled
guilty to second~degree murder rather
than face a possible death sentence for
first~degree murder. The Supreme Court
held that such a plea may be accepted, so
long as it is made voluntarily and know~
ingly, and a factual basis for the charge is
established for the record. 17
Due to the constitutional implications
involved, the trial court has broad dis~
cretion to reject a guilty plea,18 but
limited discretion to accept such a plea. 19
In Maryland, the court must first deter~
mine that the plea is being made
''[ v ]oluntarily, with the understanding
of the nature of the charge and the con~

sequences of the plea. "20 The court must
question the defendant on the record,Zl
but the court is not required to obtain an
express waiver of the three above~men~
tioned constitutional rights. 22 (Other
jurisdictions have adopted a broader in~
terpretation of the Due Process Clause
of the United States Constitution and
require express waiver of these rights on
the record. 23 )
The American Bar Association Pro~
ject on Minimal Standards for Criminal
Justice takes the position that the deci~
sion to enter a plea belongs to the defen~
dant, not to defense counsel. 24 The ABA
Project also recommends that decisions
involving constitutional rights be made
by the accused as these decisions are "so
crucial to the accused's fate."2s On the
other hand, it is also recommended that
decisions involving trial strategy be
made by defense counsel, who is ex~
pected to have experience and familiarity
with basic legal principles.26 Under this
standard, the guilty plea is the personal
choice of the defendantP The defendant,
however, is entitled to effective repre~
sentation of counsel in the course of
pleading guilty. The parameters of such
representation have only recently been
addressed by the Supreme Court. 28
Despite the personal character of the
guilty plea, the defendant may not with~
draw a properly entered plea without the
court's approval. Maryland Rule 4~242
(f) provides that the court may allow the
withdrawal of a guilty plea "where jus~
tice requires."29 In Maryland, the trial
court's decision to permit withdrawal
will not be disturbed unless the record
shows that the State or the court acted to
prejudice the defendant, or that consti~
tutional guidelines were not followed. 3o
The court may permit withdrawal at any
time before sentence has been imposed. 31
The Court of Appeals of Maryland re~
cently held that in a capital case where
the defendant obtains reversal of a death
sentence, he then may withdraw his
guilty plea at the court's discretion be~
fore the subsequent sentencing
proceeding. 32
If the trial court does not permit with~
drawal of the guilty plea, the defendant
must now obtain leave of court to appeal
the validity of a guilty plea. 33 The defen~
dant must set out, in his motion, the
specific grounds for the appeal, and
must file the motion within thirty days.3<4
Finally, the defendant's competency
to plead guilty becomes an issue where
there is evidence that the defendant has
suffered from mental illness. Maryland's
competency statute requires that the
defendant have the capacity both to un~

derstand the nature of the proceedings
and to assist in his own defense. 35 There
are different standards for competency
to waive constitutional rights than for
competency to stand trial. 36 In Massey v.
Moore,37 the Supreme Court per Justice
Douglas held: "One may not be insane
in the sense of being incapable of stand~
ing trial and yet lack the capacity to
stand trial without the benefit of
counsel. "38
Recently, in Mann v. State's Attorney
for Montgomery County,39 the Maryland
Court of Appeals held that a defendant
found incompetent to stand trial cannot
be competent to waive his privilege
against self~incrimination.40 In dicta, the
court observed that even a finding of
competency to stand trial "does not
automatically result in a conclusion that
an accused is also competent to waive
substantial rights, such as the right to
plead not guilty, the right to a jury trial,
and the right to assistance of counsel."41

In some circumstances,
the decision to plead

guilt)' merely
demonstrates that the
defendant is
incompetent to assist
in his own defense.
Thus, detense counsel should be wary
of assenting to the defendant's election
to plead guilty if there is evidence that he
is mentally ill. The decision may be de~
fective under the voluntary and knowing
standard. In some circumstances, the
decision to plead guilty merely demon~
strates that the defendant is incompetent
to assist in his own defense. •

The Insanity Plea
Maryland has adopted substantially
the Model ~Penal Code standard for the
insanity defense. 42 Under this standard
the defendant is not criminally respon~
sible for his conduct if "a~ the time of
that conduct, the defendant, because of
a mental disorder or mental retardation,
lacks substantial capacity: (1) to appre~
ciate the criminality of that conduct; or
(2) to conform that conduct to the re~
quirements of law."43 However, "a
'mental disorder' does not include an
abnormality that is manifested only by
repeated criminal or otherwise anti~
social conduct."44
Under the new statute, effective July
1, 1984, the burden to establish insanity

is placed on the defendant by a pre~
ponderance of the evidence. 45 Although
Mullaney v. Wilbur 46 requires that the
State carry the burden of establishing
the elements of the offense, the Mary~
land appellate courts have held that the
insanity plea is no more than an affirma~
tive defense 47 and that it does not defeat
the element of mens rea. 48 If it is merely a
defense, the burden may constitution~
ally be placed on the defendant. 49
Maryland does not actually have a
plea of not guilty by reason of insanity.
The issue of insanity is interposed as an
"affirmative defense,"50 in addition to
the "pleas" of not guilty, guilty and nolo
contendere. 51 The insanity defense may
be asserted by either defense counsel or
the defendant. 52 Once the issue is
generated, the trier of fact issues two
verdicts: a general verdict on the issue of
guilt, and a special verdict on the issue of
insanity. 53 The defendant, however, is
not entitled to a bifurcated trial on the
issues. 54
In Langworthy v. State, 55 the Court of
Appeals of Maryland addressed three
possible dispositions of an insanity de~
fense: (1) if the verdict on the general
issue plea is not guilty, the plea of in~
sanity becomes moot; (2) if the general
verdict is guilty and the special verdict is
sane, the judge may impose sentence;
and (3) if the general verdict is guilty and
the special verdict is insane, the defen~
dant's conduct is criminally excused,
but he has failed on the general plea. 56
Thus, if the defendant is found guilty
but insane, he may appeal the guilty
verdict. 57
The question whether a judge may
impose an insanity defense on a defen~
dant is not well settled in Maryland or in
other jurisdictions. 58 The District of
Columbia Circuit has ruled that the trial
judge may raise sua sponte an insanity
defense, even where the defendant and
his attorney have decided not to pursue
it.59 The problem with this rule is that
there is great potential for prejudice to
defense trial strategy and to the decision
on the plea. 60 In Lynch v. Overholser,61 a
case arising under the D.C. insanity sta~
tute,62 the United States Supreme Court
interpreted the statute as not providing
for criminal commitment of a defendant
on an insanity plea involuntarily raised. 63
The Court indicated that under any
other interpretation, the statute would
violate the Due Process Clause. 64 As a
result of Lynch, there appears to be little
purpose in imposing an insanity defense
on a defendant, except perhaps to steer a
dangerous individual into the civil com~
mitment system for a new hearing.

The Maryland Court of Special Ap~
peals apparently would allow defense
counsel to impose this defense on his
client. In List v. State,65 the Court ruled
expressly that defense counsel may pur~
sue an insanity defense over the defen~
dant's refusal to consent and express ob~
jections. 66 The insanity issue is an affir~
mative defense and a matter of trial
strategy, the province of the defense at~
torney.67 The Court of Appeals in List,
however, dismissed the appeal and va~
cated the lower appellate court's opinion.68
The Court of Special Appeals has also
held that defense counsel may exercise
independent discretion to withdraw an
insanity defense,69 and that the trial
court may allow withdrawal without in~
quiring as to the defendant's waiver of
constitutional rights since none are im~
plica ted. 70 The same standard for the
withdrawal of a guilty plea under Mary~
land Rule 4~242(f)71 applies to the with~
drawal of an insanity plea,72 and broad

An individual found
both guilty and insane
may be confined for a
period longer than the
maximum sentence for
the offense committed.
discretion to accept or reject the with~
drawal of an insanity plea vests in the
trial judge. 73 The trial judge may not,
however, strike an insanity defense on a
motion by the State. 74
Assuming the defendant prevails on
the insanity defense, it may be a pyrrhic
victory. At this point, it become neces~
sary to distinguish between civil and
criminal commitment.
Involuntary civil commitment occurs
where the individual is confined in a
mental health institution as a result of
the signed certificates of two physi~
cians,75 or an emergency petition by the
court, peace officers, health officers or
other interested persons. 76 Addington v.
Texas 77 requires that the committed per~
son be granted a hearing at which the
State carries the burden by clear and
convincing evidence that he poses a dan~
ger to himself or others. 78
Criminal commitment occurs where
the individual is confined after a criminal
adjudication of insanity. 79 Jones v. United
States 80 permits the burden of proving
dangerousness to be placed on the de~
fendant by a preponderance of the evi~
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dence, since the verdicts of "guilty" and
"insane" are probative of his potential
harm to others. 8!
Under the new Maryland statute, ef,
fective July 1, 1984, a defendant who is
found "not criminally responsible" is
automatically committed to a mental
health institution82 and granted a release
hearing within fifty days.83 He is then
entitled to a hearing within one year and
then one each year thereafter, 84 although
he may be confined indefinitely.8S At
each hearing, the committed person car'
ries the burden of proving by a prepon,
derance of the evidence that he is no
longer dangerous. 86 lt is constitutionally
permissible for a defendant to be committed for a period longer than the maxi,
mum sentence for the substantive
offense.87 Thus, in terms oflength ofin,
carceration, an insanity verdict may
have more oppressive consequences
than a guilty verdict for many offenses.

Ethical Problems
As has been shown, the decision to
plead guilty belongs to the defendant
alone,BB but an insanity defense ap,
parently is a tactical decision for the at'
torney.89 Since the gUilty plea and the
insanity defense are usually alternative
decisions, the distinction in decisionmaking authority can result in conflicts
between the defendant and his attor,
ney.9O Serious ethical problems can arise.
For example, the defendant who is mentally impaired may decide to plead guilty
over counsel's objections. There may be
a conflict between the attorney's duty to
represent his client zealously9! and his
duty not to disclose his client's confi,
dences and secrets, where the attorney
attacks his client's competency to plead
guilty.
These are but a few of the problems
arising from the decision of how to
plead. The ethical dilemmas involved in
representing the mentally ill are too
complex to handle here with specificity,93
but there are some guidelines to consider.
The Code of Professional Responsi,
bility requires that the attorney investi,
gate all defenses available to the client. 94
There is no duty to advance possible de'
fenses if, in the attorney's professional
judgment, the defendant's rights are bet,
ter served by other means. 9S The insanity
defense, however, is more like a plea
than any other defense and has important consequences for the defendant.
Therefore, notwithstanding List v. State,96
defense counsel should be reluctant to
decide on pursuing an insanity defense
without the consent of the client.
The Supreme Court recently ruled on
22-The Law Forum/Fall, 1984

issues of effective assistance of defense
counsel at trial in two cases; United States
v. Cronic97 and Strickland v. Washington. 98
In Strickland,99 the Court per Justice
O'Connor established certain basic
duties of counsel:
Counsel's function is to assist the
defendant, and hence counsel
owes the client a duty of loyalty, a
duty to avoid conflicts of interest....
From counsel's function as assis,
tant to the defendant derive the
over arching duty to advocate the
defendant's cause and the more
particular duties to consult with
the defendant on important deci,
sions and to keep the defendant
informed of impdrtant develop,
ments in the course of prosecution. Counsel also has a duty to
bear such skill and knowledge as
will render the tria:l a reliable
adversarial testing process. (cita,
tions omitted).lOo
The Court indicated that prevailing
standards, such as the ABA Project on
Minimal Standards for Criminal Jus,
tice,lO! are only guides to determine rea,
sonable attorney practices. 102
Although it is the accused who must
decide whether to plead guilty, 103 as a
practical matter the accused will proha,
bly rely on the attorney's advice con,
cerning the consequences of the plea and
the likelihood of acquittal at trial. Such
advice is often speculative, and the
Supreme Court has granted broad lati,
tude to defense counsel in advising the
client on the decision to plea.!04 Ineffective assistance of counsel has been found
where the attorney told the client he
could receive the death penalty but the
death penalty had been declared unconstitutional.!OS The defendant must prove
that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense.106
While a successful insanity defense
will excuse the client's criminal con,
duct lO7 and cause him to receive psychia,
tric care,108 it may' result in a longer
period of confinement than a guilty plea
would.109 A guilty plea may be advan,
tageous in terms of length of incarcera,
tion, but a guilty plea does not by itself
result in the defendant receiving treat,
ment for his mental illness. Ultimately,
the choice of plea or defense will rest on
such factors as the client's age, the
criminal charge, the nature of his illness,
extent of cooperation by the State and
the court, the psychiatric facilities available, the client's family situation, and
various other factors.
The defense attorney should not as'

sume that the defendant is capable of
pleading guilty or making informed decisions on strategy merely because he
has been found competent to stand trial.
Defense counsel's assent to a guilty plea
or insanity defense is critical where the
defendant is suffering from mental dis,
ease or disorder. In special circumstances,
the defense attorney may be forced to at'
tack the competency of his own client.
In any event, an active role by counsel is
required to assist the mentally ill defendant in reaching a decision on the plea.

Conclusion
The decision to plead guilty or inter'
pose an insanity defense is a difficult one,
especially in light of the new Maryland
insanity statute. l1O As of July 1, 1984,
the burdens for the defense of "not
criminally responsible" and subsequent
release from criminal commitment have
shifted to the defendant by a prepon,
derance of the evidence. 111 The indivi,
dual who has been adjudicated insane in
a criminal proceeding may be incar,
cerated for a period longer than the
maximum sentence for the charged of,
fense. ll2 The criminal defendant may be
adjudicated both "guilty" and "insane"
and suffer the collateral consequences of
both verdicts. 113
In appropriate circumstances, defense
counsel may consider advising the client
to plead guilty as an alternative to raising
an insanity issue at trial. A guilty verdict
results in a definite period of confine,
ment while criminal commitment can
last indefinitely,114 On the other hand,
an insanity defense is advisable where
the defendant is in present need of psy,
chiatric care, or where he faces a possible
death sentence.
Because this decision is so crucial to
the defendant's personal liberty and in'
volves basic constitutional rights, the
decision should be made by the defen,
dant after consultation with defense
counsel concerning the alternatives
available and their consequences. Defense counsel must take an active role in
the decision,making process, particu,
larly where the defendant is still suffering from mental illness.
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See e.g., People v. Gonzalez, 20 N.Y.2d 289,
294,282 N.Y.S. 538, 542:229 N.E.2d 220,
223 (J967); see also List v. State, 18 Md.
App. at 586-87, 308 A.2d at 459-60.
18 Md. App. 578, 308 A.2d 455 (1973), vacated as moot, 271 Md. 367,316 A.2d 824
(1974).
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104 S.Ct. 2039 (1984).
104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984).

99 Id.
100Id. at 2065.

ABA STANDARDS, supra.
Strickland v. Washington, _ U.S. ~
104 S.Ct. 2065 (1984).
103 ABA STANDARDS, Standard 4-5.2(a)(i).
104 See United States v. Cronic, _ U.S. ~
104 S.Ct. 2039 (1984); see also Strickland v.
Washington, _U.S. ~ 104 S.Ct. 2052
(1984).
105 Kennedy v. Maggio, 34 Crim. L. Rptr.
2430 (5th Cir. February 21, 1984).
106 Strickland v. Washington, 104 S.Ct. at
2068.
101 See MD. [HEALTH GEN.] CODE ANN. §12108 (1984).
108 See generally, id. at §§12-108-2!.
109 See id. at §12-113; see also Jones v. United
States, _ U.S. at ~ 103 S.Ct. 3052.
110 MD. [HEALTH GEN.] CODE ANN. §§12-101120 (1984).
III Id. at §12-109(b), §12-113(d).
112 Jones v. United States, _U.S. at~ 103
S.Ct.3052.
113 Pouncey v. State, 297 Md. 269, 465 A.2d
478; Langworthy v. State, 284 Md. at 599
n.12, 399 A.2d 584.
114 MD. [HEALTH GEN.] CODE ANN. §12-113(b),
(c) (1984).
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rights of any persons except former slaves
See Nowak, supra note 5 at 540-48.
20 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
21Id. at 164.
22Id. at 164, 166.
23Id. at 164-66.
24 For an analysis of the further refinement
of Supreme Court standards in this area
see Nowak, supra note 5, at 849-94.
25 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
26 For an analysis of the application of free
speech concepts by analogy to many of the
early religion cases, see Nowak, supra note
5, at 728-40, 809, 849. 873-74.
21 Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284 (D.
N.]. 1977) (Transcendental Meditation).
28 E.g., Turner v. Unif. Church, 473 F. Supp.
367 (D.R.1. 1978), afl'd, 602 F.2d, 458
(1979); Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, 535 F. Supp. 1125 (D. Mass. 1982).
29 Cj. PeoJ\le v. Patrick, 126 Cal. App. 3d at
960-61, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 282 (consent and
prejudice issues raised but not reached).
30 For example, see the nisi opinion in
Turner v. Unif. Church, 473 F. Supp. 367
(D.R.1. 1978). See also Unif. Church v.
Rosenfeld, 458 N.Y.S.2d 920 (App. Div.
1983)(church's deceit justifying denial of
special use permit).
31 See, supra note I.
32 See text accompanying notes 20 et seq.
33 An estoppel based upon a reasonable
belief that consent was valid could also be
argued. See text accompanying notes 3646 infra; contra, RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §
61 (1934)(invalid consent of "invalid
personality" ).
34 Technically, the defense would be valid
only as against the victim which would
arguably privilege the religious society to
engage in the activities upon which third
party claims such as those of the parents in
George were based.
35 See, supra note I; Cf. Note, Role of the
Child's Wishes in Custody Proceedings, 6
U.c. DAVIS L. REV. 332, 337 (l973)(fourteen years old as a reference age).
36 See, Note, A bduction, Religious Sects and
the Free Exercise Guarantee, 25 SYRACUSE

